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ABSTRACT 
The Ikllian/Dutch SAX satellite, to be launched end of 
April 1996, is a scientific spacecraft, built to explore 
celestial X-ray sources. The software for the Attitude 
and Orbit Control Subsystem on-board computer for 
SAX consists of special purpose Basic Software, which 
perfonns operatiiig system functions, illid of Application 
Software (ASW). The ASW has been developed by 
NLR, under contract with Fokker Space. Main goal of 
the application software is to ensure an accurate and 
stable pointing of the satellite's maill axis during periods 
of up to 28 hours. Due to the mission critical nature of 
the ASW, which shall be able to operate during extended 
periods without ground conL?ct, it has to be very 
reliable. 
This software has been developed in two phases. At 
first. an iterative full s ~ ~ l e  dev lopment process bas been 
executed, supported by a sep'mte independent 
integration and test lawn. This has led to a high quality 
elid product, ready for AOCS subsystem i~itegration. 
While the AOCS subsystem illtegratio~l tests were 
executed (by Alenia Spazio), a number of new 
requirements were introduced. These were unplernented 
during the second (~naintenance) phase of ASW 
development, during which a smaller develop~ne~it t&wn 
worked on the software, while the ASW ilitegntion tests 
were combined wid1 AOCS subsystem integration tests. 
The differences in PA during the full scale developinelit 
phase and the maintenance phase are compared, leading 
to a number of quantitative and qualifative conclusions. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Ik?litul/D~t~h SAX satellite is a scientific spacecraft, 
wilh as lnission to explore celestial X-ray sources (ref. 
[I]). It is funded by the Italian space agcncy (AS0 and 
the Netherlaids Agency for Aerospace Progr;umnes 
(NIVR). The satellite is to perfonn a systematic a id  
comprehensive observation of celestial X-my sources in 
the 0.1-200 keV energy range wilh p;lnicul;u emphasis 
on spectral and timing measurements. The sarellite (Fig. 
1) will be injected into a circular equatorial orbit wilh an 
inclination of less dim 5' and an initial altitude of 600 
km by AUas Centaur launcher in April, 1996. The 
nominal mission lifetime is two years, wicll a design 
goal of four years. 
The Attitude and Orbit Conuol Subsystem (AOCS) of 
the satellite has been developed by Fokker Space B.V. 
under contract with the satellite prime contractor Alenia 
Spazio (Roma I~aly). As subco~iuactor of Fokker Space, 
the National Aerospace Laboratory NLR has developed 
the Application Software (ASW) for the AOCS on-board 
computer (ref. [2]). 
Fig. 1 SAX satellite 
This software has been developed in two phases. At 
first, an iterative full scale development process has been 
executed, supported by a separate independent 
integration and test team. This has led to a high quality 
end product, ready for AOCS subsystem integration. 
While the AOCS subsystem integration tests were 
executed (by Alenia Spazio), a number of new 
requirements were i~~troduced. These were implemented 
during the second (maintenance) phase of ASW 
development, during which a smaller development team 
worked on the software, while the ASW integration tests 
were combined with AOCS subsystein integration tests. 
This approach has led to a reduction in the turn-around 
lime for the implementation of new requirements and a 
reduction in the needed test effort, but, as consequence, 
some specification errors and software errors could 
remain undetected until the subsystem integration tests. 
In the sequel. a brief introduction is given of the ASW 
(section 2). followed by a description of the development 
Y 
and maintenm~ce processes (section 3). Section 4 
describes the PA approach during the full scale 
de~el0pInellt process, iuld section 5 describes Ule PA 
approach during d ~ e  maintenance project. A quantimtive 
and qualimtive evaluation is given in sections 6 and 7. 
The paper is finisbed with some concluding remarks. 
2. THE SAX AOCS APPLICATION 
SOFTWARE 
The AOCS subsystem hardware consists of (Fig. 2): 
- The Attitude Colluol Computer (ACC). This 
computer is based on a 80C86 ~nicroprocessor 
extended with a 8087 co-processor. The ACC is fully 
redund,mt. Two identical, independent, coinpulers are 
integrated into one unit. One of the two is cold 
smdby.  
- A set of attitude sensors (Sun Acquisition Sensors, 
Magnetometen, Gyroscopes, and S t u  Trackers). 
- A set of actuators (Rextioii Wheels, Magnetic 
Torquer Rods, nnd a Reaction Conuol Subsystem). 
These units are connected to each o(her by a 
'Modular AttitudeCo~ltrol System bus' (MACS-bus). 
The AOCS subsystem is connected to t l ~ e  otller units 
of the satellite via , u ~  '011-Board DaL? Handliilg bus' 
(OBDH-bus). 
The AOCS is coi~uolled by software ru~~niiig in the 
ACC. This software is divided into two packages: 
- Basic Software (BSW), developed by Alenia Spazio 
that provides operating systern services and basic 
illrefface services to the MACS and OBDI-I busses. 
It hides the ACC hardware peculiarities for the 
Application Software. 
- Application Software (ASW), developed by NLR. 
This software provides all attitude conuol k~sks nnd 
manages the application-dependent comnunication 
with the ground (via the OBDH) and with Ule AOCS 
sensors ruld actuators. 
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Fig. 2 Simplified block diagram of the SAX AOCS 
The basic requirements on the AOCS ,md hence on the 
ASW software are to provide the capability to: 
- C o i m l u ~ d  the main instrument axis of SAX to any 
direction (within the pointii~g consmints) wiU~ an 
accumcy of 90" m ~ d  the other axes wid1 an accuracy 
of 16.5 arcmin. The comm,u~ded attitude must be 
maintained d u r i ~ ~ g  pointing periods of maxi~nal 28 
110urs. 
- Perfonn health checking on the sensors and actuators 
and the related redundancy management functions. 
- Safeguard the satellite against violatioi~ of Ule safe 
pointing dornain. This safe pointing domain is 
defined by power conslraints and by Lhe fact Ulat Ule 
main scientific instruinent will be destroyed by 
(indirect) radiation from Ule sun. Therefore, Ule angle 
between the maill ii~struine~~t axis of the satellite and 
die sunvector must be at least 60'. 
- Autono~nously acquire and inainkaiil a s d e  attitude 
when no groulld col~n,uldillg is available and after 
excursions outside Ule safe poir~tir~g domain. 
- Process ground comin;u~ds and generate relev'mt 
lele~neuy for beallfl checki~~g on the ground and for 
attitude recoilstruction in relation with the processing 
of the acquired scientific data. 
The ASW software has been divided into two parts: 
- Basic Attitude Cor~uol (BAC) software. This part is 
highly reliable and safe. It will be (i~~itially) stored in 
Read Only Memory (ROM) ill Ule ACC, togelher 
with Ule BSW. Main purpose of this software is to 
provide UIC functionality needed to acquire and keep 
a safe satellire attitude alter power-up and fallback. 
Furthennore it conL?ins (he daLz handling functions 
needed to submit dle sklre of the AOCS to Ule 
ground and to give Ule control over (011 grouild 
c o l ~ n a n d )  to the EAC software. Afler an 
autonomous fallback to Ule BAC software, Ule 
ground operations lean c;u~ xmlyze the reason for 
fallback m d  devise solutions to circuinvent this 
reason. 
- Extended Attitude Control (EAC) software. This 
softwnre provides all fur~ctio~~s required for the 
AOCS, ii~cluding the conuol laws for accurate 
scie~~tific paintings and Ule generation of full attitude 
reconstructioi~ tele~netsy dam. EAC is stored in 
Rando~n Access Memory (RAM) of the ACC and 
ca1 be loadcd. activated andor modified 011 ground 
co~tunand. 
3. DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
The software 11% been developed by NLR according lo 
the rules of the ESA Softwm Engineering Sm~dzuds 
(ref. [3]), with as innin exception the way of coop era ti or^ 
between Fokker Space xld the NLR. The ESA sLmdards 
cover the situation U~at the principnl specifies his 
requirements in the form of a User Require~neilts 
~o&ent (URD) which is used as sole input for the 
developer. In the case of the SAX AOCS software 
development Fokker Space was not only responsible for 
the User Requirements of the software, but also for the 
algorithmic details of the application software (ref. [4]). 
Based on a high-level UFO for both the Basic Software 
and the Application Software, NLR has developed a 
Software Requirements Document and a Architectural 
Design Document for the ASW. The detailed design of 
the software, however, was developed in close 
cooperation between Fokker Space 'and NLR. Fokker 
Space detailed the algorithms for attitude control, unit 
health checking and redundancy management decisions. 
NLR developed the software design and the actual code. 
The algorithms were documented in so called 'Design 
Specification' documents, and in one docu~nent defining 
all relevant panmeter values, the so called 'Parameter 
Interface Dakz Document CIDD)'. The approach thus 
followed can be characterised as an concurrent 
engineering process. 
During the full scale development project of the ASW a 
separate NLR team acted as Indeper~de~~t Verificatio~~ 
and Validxion (IV&V) team. Using a dedicated real- 
time simulation environment for the ACC (SAX-TSA, 
ref. [>I), this t&un developed validation tests for the 
integmted AOCS software (BSW and ASW), covering 
all aspects of the User Requirements Document. 
The full scale development project was closed will1 the 
delivery of BAC and EAC software in the last quarter of 
1993. Parallel with the finalisatiori of Lhe develop~nent, 
AOCS subsystem tests were executed using tl~e BAC 
software at Alenia Spazio. The AOCS subsystem tesls 
applied a similar test environment but will1 (lliglit 
representative) Iwdware sensors and actuators in Uie 
loop (ref. [6]). This resulted in the existence of the 
following panllel activities: 
- maintenance of the Design Specifications x ~ d  
Pmne te r  IDD at Fokker Space; 
- develop~nent and unit-level tests of new and 
modified software code at NLR; 
- independent integration and validation tests of tile 
software at NLR using SAX-TSA: 
- subsyste~n integration tests at Alenia using SAX- 
TSA. 
After the develop~neut, a new project was skuted to 
maintain the ASW, i.e. to update it according to new 
requirements 'and to the results of U I ~  AOCS subsyste~n 
integntion tests. h~ view of budgekvy and time 
comuaints, it was decided by Alenia Spazio and Fokker 
Space to structure this maintenance around the execution 
of the subsystem integration tests. Fokker Space and 
NLR specialists were colocated at Alenia Spazio, 
shortening the co~nmunication lines. The develop~nent 
team at NLR was decreased to a core maintenance lean. 
No separate validation of code changes was perfonned 
at NLR. The result of this approach was that Non- 
Conform;uice Reports (NCR's) could be solved 
efficiently and swiftly. During the subsystem integration, 
NCR's could be discussed on-site between Fokker 
Space, Aleuia Sp'uio and NLR. Algoritlnn changes and 
the related (temporarily) code modifications were 
developed using Alenia Spazio facilities and the failed 
tests could be repeated immediately. However, in order 
to prevent a degradation of the overall software quality, 
the formal implementation of changes was done using 
the original software development cnviron~nent at NLR, 
using the Product Assurance tools and procedures also 
applied during the full-scale development. 
The maintenance has been executed this way from tile 
end of 1993 to mid 1995. During Ulis period, over 50% 
of the sourcefiles was modified at least once due to new 
andlor updated requirements. 
4. PRODUCT ASSURANCE APPROACH DURlNG 
T I E  FULL SCALE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 
The Product Assurance approach followed during tl~e 
initial full scale develop~nent of the ASW consisted of 
d~eapplication of a number of Cofnputer Aided Software 
Engineering (CASE) tools ;u~d the execution of a 
number of procedures, boo1 for Ule develop~nent nun 
and for the PA manager. All procedures were approved 
by Fokker Space for complia~ce wiU~ the SAX PA 
standards. They have also bee11 certified to confonn to 
t l~e  IS0 9001 stmdard. 
- Teatmvork for s~ruclured analysis and design. 
Teamwork has been used to input and check the 
Software Requirements and Ule Architectural Design. 
It supports the Structure Analysis method for (real- 
tune) software systems as defined by Yourdon, 
DeMarco, Constantine and Hatley. The requirements 
and architectural design have mainly been described 
ill Data Flow Diagrams and State Tr,msition 
Diagrams. The &1ta that is handled by the ASW has 
been described in detail in a Data Dictio~i~uy. 
Teamwork includes a powerful checking option to 
ensure the inten~al co~isistency of the thus obkuned 
functional decomposition. 
The DekGled Design of the ASW has been developed 
using the Smcmred Design method, also suppomd 
by Teamwork. Each individual task of the ASW is 
defined with one Structure Chan and a nulnber of 
Module Specifications. Also for this development 
phase, Teamwork provides a number of consistency 
checks, altl~ough these are less powerful U~an the 
checking options for the Smctured Alkdysis method. 
- Design srandard, supporfed by a checking 1001. A 
standard has been defined for the detailed design 
infonnation. conklined UI the Module Specifications. 
These stul&uds consist of the definition of a 
pseudolanguage that consisted of the basic constructs 
for structured programming. Due to the simplicity of 
this language, it was an easy w k  to develop a 
software tool that checks whether the design adheres 
F .  to t h ~ s  standud. This tool has been applied by Ule 
developers before the coding process of every 
 nodule. During the preparation of deliverable 
(hardcopy) design documentation, all lnodules were 
checked by PA for adhemcy to the skuidard. 
Automnated code skeleton generation from [lie 
Teammvork design inform~~ation. Based on the simple 
design Ialguage, a tool has been developed to 
generate a code skeleton for every lnodule from Uie 
Temwork Module Specification infonnation. Such 
skeleton contained die following infonnation: 
* A copy of the detailed design text as comlneot; 
* The proper #include files to be used for intenla1 
interfaces; 
* The detailed design text, ill which the logic 
consuucts were converted to cotnpilable C 
consuucts. 
The coding of the module could U I ~ I I  be limited lo a 
malual conversion of the assignments, algoriU11ns ;urd 
so on to proper C code. 
Code standard, supported by a standard-cliecking 
tool. A standard has been defined for the use of the 
ANSI C lruiguage for the ASW. The main aim of Uiis 
standard was to litnit the use of C-consuucts to a 
s~nall, reliable x ~ d  tesklble subset and to force a 
unifonn coding style during l11e colnplete 
developrne~lt As for the design standard, also U I ~  
coding stan&ud was enforced by a cl~eckil~g-tool. No 
code could be brougl~t under col~figur;uioi~ conuol 
that did not obey to U~is coding sLlnd,ud. 
Module tesl standards, based on code coverage 
analysis 1001s. The module testing was supponed by 
a (public-domain) test coverage tool. Module tests 
had to execute every skltement of the code at least 
once. In those (me) cases where this requirelnent 
proved to be loo expensive, code walklhrough by an 
independent progrxntner was allowed after prior 
approval of the PA malager. 
Configuration control tools andprocedures. All flight 
code was stored under suict configuration conuol, 
including the test descriptions, test code, test in- and 
output, and the related make-files. The configuration 
cor~uol procedure included a change review by all 
Work Package Managers involved. After 
implementalion of an approved change, independel11 
checks were executed by Ule Coufiguratior~ Conuol 
Manager that the code was complete, U~at Ule design- 
m ~ d  coding sku~dnrds were adhered to, and that thc 
  nodule testing yielded co~nplete coverage and was 
repatable using the latest version of all software 
under col~figuration conuol. As each code lnodule 
conkuned a copy of the design specification in Ule 
heading comlnenl, a separate check was prescribed lo 
ensure that the detailed design information in the 
Teanwork model was identical to this cotnlnent (also 
after module changes). 
Automnated document production from lhe Tea~n~vork 
design infortnation. Using the sm~dard interface 
software between Teamwork a ~ d  Ule DeskTop 
Publishing package Framemaker, the design 
information has bee11 transformed to printed 
documenk~tion without introduction of errors. This 
automated conversion also tninilnised the required 
effort. 
- Rcquiremncnts traceability nlafrices. At every fonnal 
update of the hardcopy documentalion, a independent 
~nruiual check was done by verifying the uacezibility 
between the latest version of the design specifications 
and the dekuled design. This check involved all k650 
dekuled specifications. 
In addition to these procedures, the notion of egoless 
prograrntning (ref. [71) was unposed on the project team. 
All software developed in die project was considered to 
be owned by the colnplete temn in stead of the 
individual developers. This implied U~at he design and 
source of every module could be freely consulted aid 
co i~nented  by all team members. Besides the obvious 
effect of redundmcy in detail knowledge of the 
software, this way of working also stimulates early 
detection of errors. 
5. PRODUCT ASSURANCE APPROACH DURING 
TIE  MAINTENANCE PROJECT 
During d ~ e  maintenance project. the sane Product 
Assurance approach was maintained as during the full 
scale development. tiowever, as a result of the smaller 
team size, the independel~cy of certain checks was 
reduced. The roles of  nodule developer, Work Package 
Manager, and Configuration Control M'vlager could be 
executed by one and the same team member, however at 
different times. As it was recognised that this could have 
negative effects on the quality of the delivered work, the 
team members were stimulated to execute these roles 
conscientiously and to srriclly follow the prescribed 
procedures. A few procedural shortcuts were 
imple~nented, however. An inskvlce was the production 
of executable images of the inlegrated code. The 
procedures prescribed that all tested code changes were 
put under configuration conlrol before a formal 
executable image could be produced. As result of the 
requirement that Ule continued correct execution of all 
module tests was to be checked during the fonnalimtion 
process, this process could Like up to a few working 
days. During UIC iliitial developinet~l, it was proven that 
the process of fonnalising tested changes was uanspare~it 
for the user of the executable. Therefore, it was decided 
that informal executable images could be used for formal 
testing at Alenia, on the condition that Uie related fonnal 
executable image was checked afterwards to be byte-for- 
byte identical with the informal one. This shortcut 
significanUy decrezaed the turn-around time for 
requested changes and hence increased the efficiency of 
the entire AOCS subsystem integration team. 
 QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION OF TI= 
APPROACHES 
During the independent validation tests, executed as part 
of the initial development project, a total of 146 NCR's 
have been generated by NLR. 111 view of the 
development approach mentioned above, the quality of 
the NLR co~ltributio~~ to the Application Software can be 
measured in terms of NonConformances Ulat could be 
solved by changing the ASW solely, without a 
corresponding change in the Design Specifications or h e  
Parmeter IDD. In the remainder of this paper, these 
NCR's are indicated as "ASW-related NCR's". Ref. [S] 
gives the following classificatio~l of these NCR's: 
- 27%: Basic Software; 
- 27%: SAX-TSA test system, including the 
environment simulation software; 
- 23%: Design Specifications or the Parameter DID: 
- 9%: Indication of unclear or inco~~sistent 
require~nenu; 
- 8%: ASW-related NCR's; 
- 4%: Hardware ("Functional") Model of the ACC, 
that was used during the tests; 
- 2%: other causes. 
In tokzl, 11 ASW-related NCR's were generated during 
these validation tests. During the (independetlt and 
pmllel) AOCS subsyste~n illlegration tests using the 
sane  ASW software, no ASW-related NCR's were 
generated by Alenia. 
The size of the initial version of the ASW was 2350 
sourcefiles conk?ining in tot4 ?16,000 lines of non- 
comment source code. The quality of Ule code before 
validation rests can thus be expressed as being 0.7 errors 
per 1,000 lines of code (KLOC). In literature, figures are 
stated between 1 mid 25 errors per KLOC for delivered 
code afler validatio~~ rests (ref. [8]). The ASW cnn chus 
be categorised as high-quality software. 
During the mainte~~nnce project, the code lnodifications 
were validated by Alenia in the scope of t l~e  subsystem 
integration tests. During this period, a total of 10 ASW- 
related NCR's was generated by Alenia. Of these. 2 
NCR's could be uaced to bugs ha t  originated it1 tlle 
il~ilial development project. l~lten~al NLR inspections on 
the delivered code led to two more NCR's, related to 
wrong parameter values in Ule delivered code. 
Durit~g the inaintenance period. h e  size of Lhe software 
increased to t410 sourcefiles with *20,000 lines of non- 
colnlnent source code. It is difficult to measure tile 
percentlge of code that was modified during this period. 
An estimate is ha t  k8.000 lines of code has beer, 
changed a ~ d l o r  added during this period. This leads to 
a quality figure of about 1.5 errors per 1,000 lines of 
newhnodified code before validatio~~. The bigher number 
of errors is probably caused by: 
- the higher complexity of the ~naintenance klsk. It is 
well known that the chnnge process of complex 
sofrware is more error prone thal original 
development of code; 
- the (small) margins in both processor speed and 
memory size forced the maintenance team into 
optilnisation of the code, which increased the 
software complexity further. 
The quality of the software after validatioll is indicated 
by the fact that during SAX satellite integration tests no 
ASW-related NCR's at all were generated. 
7. QUALITATIVE EVALUATION OF THE 
APPROACHES 
Comparing the approaclles during Ule two phases. the 
followi~~g topics are considered: 
- Development budget 
- Development time. 
- Quality. 
- Flow of information. 
- Organisatio~~al spects. 
7.1. Development budget 
The two phases differed mainly in the absence of a 
separate IV&V team during the maintenance project. 
The possibility of redundant test activities executed by 
the IV&V team at NLR and the (pcu;lllel operating) 
subsystem it~tegration team at Alenia was thus 
effectively removed. This led to an obvious cost saving. 
On the other hand. the subsystem integration team had 
to spend more Lime on verifi~rtion testing. This, together 
wirh the colo~?tiorl costs, led to ;ul cost increase. 
Although difficult to quantify, is seerns that the ovenll 
effect of the maintenance approach was a reduction of 
the cost 
7.2. Development time 
During the maintenmce project many requirement 
changes were uiggered by the results of subsystem 
integration tests at Aleilia These results could be 
discussed on short notice between Alenia and the 
colocated teanunembers of Fokker Space and NLR. A 
copy of Lhe soflwzue development system was also 
available at Aleoia. Thus, proposed (requirement) 
changes could be implemented quickly and tested in the 
fonn of infonnal softwtue versions. This approach led to 
a short tun,-around time for infonnal changes, which 
was not possible without the colocation and duplicatio~l 
of the development cnviron~nent. 
As in the process of fonnalisi~lg changes the separate 
IV&V tests were skipped, fonnal software versions 
could be made available to Ale~~ia  e rlier. These fonnal 
versions were uansferred e l e c u o ~ ~ i ~ ~ l l y  from NLR to 
Alenia, minunising uansfer delays. 
The decision to skip the separate IV&V tests 
co~nplicated the process of finding the cause of NCR's. 
Especially in the field of testing the unit health checking 
software, it was sometimes difficult to decide whether a 
problem was caused by the detailed requirements, Ule 
software implementltioii, the unit simulation software, or 
the actual hardware in the Imp. 
7.3. Quality 
The effects on quality are difficult to qualify. It was 
perceived during Uie maintenance project that iterative 
changes, triggered by NCR's and implemented under 
time pressure, could lead to a reduction of the quality of 
the elid product. Therefore, Uie procedure explicitly 
docu~nented Uiat code changes Uiat were developed on- 
site were to be regarded as informal fixes. The 
formalisation of requirement and code changes was done 
at  Fokker Space and NLR premises as a separate activity 
and followed all prescribed change review atld testing 
procedures. 
Although a small tean worked on the software during 
the mainten;uice projecc this approach enabled the 
cousultuicy of the complete original development tean 
to minunise the risk of unwaited side effecs of 
modifications. In  a number of cases, the fonnal review 
process identified such errors, that were difficult to 
detect by testing. 
7.4. Flow of infonnation 
As result of Uie partial colocation of Uie project teatns at  
the Alenia premises, the co~nmunicatio~~ lines between 
all parties i~ivolved were shorl. Tliis improved Uie 
quality of the i~ifonnatio~i flow, on Uie expense of the 
colocatio~l costs. 
It should be noted chat the future possibilities of 
Cornputer Supported Cooperative Work, enhzlced wiUi 
high batidwidll~ inteniational network con~~ectioos, will 
offer similar irnprove~nents of infonnation sharing 
without Uie expenses of colocalion. BoUi NLR aid  
Alenia are involved in European researcli projecls to 
study these techniques ( U I ~  RACE PAGEIN project, ref. 
[9] and the ACTS MULTICLJBE project, ref. [lo]). 
7.5. Organisational aspects 
The approach to fonn a colocated multi-organizalio~lal 
team during subsysle~n testing can lead lo confusion 
with regard to the orgalisation a i d  Uie decisio~l-making 
process. llierefore, Uie hierarcllical suucture of 
co~iuactorlsub-co~itracLor/sub-sub-contractor was striclly 
maintained during Uie maintenance project. Allhougli 
informal working agreelneiils could be made ktwcen 
p'mies, all formal decisions were taken slong Uie 
hierarcliical lines. The authors believe Uiat Ulis was 
beneficial to the project. 
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
I11 this paper, Uie Protluct Assurar~ce approach has been 
described for  lie develop~nent of flight-critical 
application software. It has been shown Uiat the 
approach followed during Uie initial full-scale 
developrnerit project has led to a high-quality elid 
product. Some factors contributing to this high quality 
'me: 
- Uie implementation of the PA approach inlo Ule 
developmerit suite; 
- Uie enforcing of die staidards by automated checking 
software; 
- Uie automated infomiation exchange between 
develop~nent and docu~ne~itation tools. 
After the initial dcvelopmeng an extended maintenatice 
period was entered, during which a significmt portion of 
the software was added or modificd. During Uiis period, 
a smaller lean worked on the sortwwe, atid one level of 
independent testing was omitted in order to save 
develop~nent une and budget. Alhough the mailitenance 
of complex software is more error-prone Uiai the initial 
development of such softwwe, Uie quality level of the 
development process was only slighlly reduced in the 
selise that a few more ASW-related NCR's were to be 
solved during the validation l e ss  of Uie inodified 
software. 
Therefore, as result of the PA measures durillg Uie 
development and maintenance, Uie auUiors are confident 
Ulat the software iself will be prove its liigli quality 
during Uie operational life of SAX. 
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